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Abstract 
Santiago was one of the first cities outside the OECD to implement a tradable permit program to 
control air pollution. This paper looks closely at the program’s performance over the past ten years, 
stressing its similarities and discrepancies with trading programs implemented in developed countries, 
and analyzing how it has reacted to regulatory adjustments and market shocks. Studying Santiago’s 
experience allows us to discuss the drawbacks and advantages of applying tradable permits in less 
developed countries. 
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Tradable Permits in Developing Countries: Evidence from Air 
Pollution in Santiago, Chile 
Jessica Coria and Thomas Sterner∗ 
Introduction 
Policymakers have paid increasing attention to market-based policy instruments 
over the last decades. Tradable emission permits have been at the center of this discussion 
due to the theoretical promise of cost-effectiveness and because they have been used 
successfully in the United States to reduce sulphur dioxide (SO2) and nitrogen oxides 
(NOx). However, it remains an open question whether tradable permits are appropriate for 
use in transition and developing economies when they lack institutions and expertise with 
market-based policies. There are also many crucial design issues for the permit schemes as 
well as several competing instruments, such as environmental taxes. 
Those arguing in favor of market-based instruments emphasize that they are 
efficient instruments that relax the trade-off between economic growth and improved 
environmental quality, and that they can be achieved without specific knowledge of the 
technology or pollution-reduction costs of polluting sources. On the other hand, those 
opposed to the use of tradable permit programs in developing countries emphasize the lack 
of transparency and monitoring possibilities, the inadequate legal systems, and, foremost, 
the difficulties involved in creating a functioning market observed in less developed 
countries (see Bell and Russell 2002; Bell 2004). However, pervasive constraints would 
affect the performance of any instrument, including both economic policies and command-
and-control policies (Ellerman 2002), although the implementation of more sophisticated 
policy instruments, as tradable emission permits, might require the decision maker to 
implement some particular institutional changes. For that reason, some market advocates 
argue that emissions taxes would be more appropriate, since they imply a change to an 
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effective economic incentive system and raise revenue for environmental projects and 
programs (see Eskeland et al. 1992; Krupnick 1997; and Blackman and Harrington 2000). 
Finally, advocates of trading approaches argue that, as countries develop and as economies 
and political systems become more willing to impose real environmental requirements, 
trading programs will become more adequate. Thus, the important point is to start 
developing the institutions to build over the coming years now (see Krueger 2003). 
Many donors and advisors have promoted the use of market-based instruments as 
the key to more effective environmental protection in the developing world (see O’Connor 
1998). However, there has been rather limited experimentation with tradable permits in less 
developed countries, although efforts have been made in some transitional countries, such 
as Poland, Kazakhstan, the Czech Republic, and the Slovak Republic, to implement 
emission trading programs during the 1990s (see Zylicz 1995; Farrow 1999; Hauff and 
Missfeldt 2000; and Bell 2004) and raise academic and governmental interest in 
implementing emissions trading in China (see Ellerman 2002). In all of these cases, the 
main concern has been related to the transition from pre-existing environmental regulations 
to tradable emissions permits and the monitoring and enforcement capabilities that would 
be required in order to ensure compliance.  
Santiago was one of the first cities outside the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) to implement a tradable permit program. The 
program launched in 1997 to control emissions coming from stationary sources of pollution 
has been characterized by a combination of failures affecting the attractiveness of trading: 
over-allocation of permits, high transaction costs, lack of clear penalties for sources in 
violation, and several regulatory changes affecting the tenure over emission permits and 
hampering trade. The total amount of emission permits initially granted to incumbent 
sources has been decreased twice; the rate of offsetting has been raised twice while the 
program’s rules have led many sources to lose their emission permits because trade is only 
allowed within a specified period of time and banking permits are not possible. 
How has the emissions market reacted to these new regulations and conditions? 
Currently 46.3 percent of the initial allocation of permits are void and 38 percent of these 
voided permits have been lost because incumbent sources did not trade before the legal 
deadline. 
Why did sources not trade before the legal deadline? For this paper, we analyzed the 
design and implementation issues limiting the development of the tradable permit market in Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Santiago, as well as the challenges and advantages of applying tradable permits in less 
developed countries.  
Previous studies evaluating the performance of the Santiago’s trading program were 
done at early stages of its implementation. Montero et al. (2002) found that the 
grandfathering used to allocate emissions permits initially created economic incentives for 
incumbent sources to more readily declare their historic emissions in order to claim 
permits. O’Ryan et al. (2002) examined the impact of the introduction of natural gas in the 
applicability of the tradable permit program, concluding that this fuel increased the range of 
emissions potentially abated at a lower cost and reduced the efficiency gains from using a 
market-based instrument. Finally, Palacios and Chavez (2005) evaluated the performance 
of the program in terms of enforcement, concluding that the aggregate level of over-
compliance coexisted with frequent violations of regulations by some of the sources. This 
paper goes more deeply into these issues using an updated database in order to analyze 
whether the program has improved over time and how it has reacted to regulatory 
adjustments and market shocks. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main lessons from 
the international experience with tradable permit programs. The second section describes 
the tradable permit program applied in Santiago. Then, the design and implementation 
issues limiting the development of the market are analyzed. The fourth and final section 
reviews the lessons that can be learned from Santiago’ experience and concludes. 
1.    The Use of Tradable Permit Programs in Developed Countries 
Although the efficiency properties of tradable permit programs were discussed by 
some economists in the early 1970s (Dales 1968; and Montgomery 1972), it was not until 
the early 1980s that they started to be promoted in academia. The rise of interest occurred 
at the same time as when many of the basic environmental laws were being written in the 
United States. They were used to provide greater flexibility to firms charged with 
controlling air pollutant emissions (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s [EPA] 
Emission Trading Programs), to phase out leaded gasoline and ozone-depleting 
chlorofluorocarbons (CFC) from the market and to reduce sulphur dioxides (SO2) and 
nitrogen oxides (NOx) in the Los Angeles basin (RECLAIM). There was a gradual learning 
process concerning design issues that led to the launching of the successful U.S. tradable 
permit program to control acid rain by cutting nationwide emissions of SO2. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Apart from the European Union’s Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the world’s 
first large-scale CO2 emissions trading program, few applications of tradable permits 
existed previously in Europe, since taxes and other instruments were used more frequently. 
The most important programs include the U.K. Emissions Trading Scheme (UK ETS), the 
Danish CO2 trading program, the Dutch offset programs, and BP’s internal experiment. On 
the other hand, very few applications have been implemented in transition or developing 
countries. Chile and Singapore were pioneers in this area, while some pilot programs were 
introduced in Poland during the 1990s.1  
The experience with emissions trading over the past 27 years offers some lessons 
concerning the use of tradable permits in controlling pollution (see Hahn and Hester 1989; 
Hahn 1989; Rico 1995; Stavins 1998; Schmalensee et al. 1998; Salomon 1999; Tietenberg 
1999; Ellerman 2000; Stavins 2001; Boemare and Quirion 2002; Burtraw and Palmer 2003; 
Ellerman 2005; Victor and House 2006; Ellerman and Buchner 2007; and Convery and 
Redmont 2007). The first lesson concerns the functionality of emission trading as a 
regulatory instrument, while the second lesson concerns the features that make trading 
programs more efficient. 
Regarding the first lesson, the overall experience with emissions trading is that it 
can work. To date, targeted emissions-reductions have been achieved and exceeded. Total 
abatement costs have been significantly less than what they would have been in the absence 
of trading. Recent studies indicate that benefits exceed costs by a significant margin (see 
Burtraw and Palmer 2003; and Chestnut et al. 2005), while trading volume has increased 
over time with a significant fraction of allowance transfers among economically unrelated 
parties. 
As regards the second lesson, there are several features that are important for 
emissions trading to work. The most fundamental is that the rights to the environmental 
service or resource in question be allocated in a manner that creates some permanence and 
confidence. Additional features are realistic incentives to trade, spatial and temporal 
flexibility, inclusion of the private sector to fulfill brokerage needs, monitoring and 
                                                 
1 In 1991, the first pilot project of emissions trading was carried out in Chorzow as an experiment following 
an agreement between the minister of environment and regional authorities. The project let several polluters in 
one of the most contaminated neighborhoods jointly comply with individual emissions standards. Despite 
profound legal problems and a turbulent political environment against the policy, it led to a radical decrease of 
pollution and significant savings (see Zylicz 1995). There are also a large number of programs in various 
countries with tradable fishing quotas that have quite a few similarities to the programs we discuss here. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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enforcement, and the allocation of allowances. (See appendix 1 for a comparison of 
selected features of emissions trading programs implemented to date.) 
The right to trade must be clearly defined and not subject to case-by-case approval. 
Ellerman (2005) distinguished between the incentives to trade provided by the three types 
of emissions trading: credit-based, allowance-based, and averaging-based trading. In credit-
based trading, credits can be created by reducing one source’s emissions more than required 
by some pre-specified standard and transferring the credit to another source, which is 
thereby allowed to increase emissions above the standard. Although sources can propose 
trades, the final decision to create the credits and make the transfers rests with the regulator. 
On the other hand, in allowance-based trading, rights to emit are created initially and 
distributed to sources, and there is no presumption that individual sources will limit 
emissions to the number of allowances they receive. They are free to trade allowances and 
the only requirement is that allowances equal emissions at the end of every compliance 
period. Averaging-based trading presumes a pre-specified standard of which emissions are 
traded, but subsequent trades between sources are not confined by regulatory approval. 
In practice, credit-based trading has not worked well because of the high transaction 
costs associated with the creation and transfer of credits. The process of getting regulatory 
approval limited trading in the early EPA programs because of the uncertainty involved in 
getting individual trades. Quite the opposite, trading observed in allowance-based (such as 
RECLAIM and the Acid Rain Program) and averaging-based programs (such as the Lead 
Phase-Out) has been much greater.  
If environmental damages do not depend on localization of emissions and 
monitoring costs are not disproportionate, trading program should include as many sources 
as possible. First, the larger the number of participants, then the larger the abatement cost 
differences among firms and the larger the benefits of trading. Second, a greater number of 
sources reduces the risk of market power in the permit market. Flexibility allows for a 
broader set of compliance alternatives to be considered in terms of timing and spatial 
coverage. All of the U.S. emissions trading programs, except RECLAIM, have included 
inter-temporal trading or “banking.” Banking provides important flexibility for sources to 
undertake early reductions to accumulate allowances that can be used to ease compliance in 
the future, dampening the volatility of permit prices since it accommodates dynamic market 
changes and allows for shifts in industry structure with constant total emissions. According 
to Ellerman (2005), the Acid Rain Program, which has the greatest flexibility since it 
allows nationwide spatial trading and unlimited banking, has experienced price fluctuations 
of no more than 3:1 when measured as the ratio of the highest observed price to the lowest. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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By contrast, RECLAIM is the most restricted program in the scope of spatial trading: it 
does not allow for banking and has experienced price fluctuations of 60:1. 
It is clear that high transaction costs lower the effectiveness of tradable permits 
significantly. Transaction costs include the costs of finding an appropriate trading partner, 
establishing the terms of trade, and completing the arrangements. The inclusion of the 
private sector to fulfill brokerage needs reduces these costs, which increases the economic 
incentives to trade. According to Tietenberg (1999), most observers of the early EPA 
emissions trading programs agree that fewer trades took place than necessary to achieve 
full cost-effectiveness and that high transactions costs played a role in explaining this 
shortcoming. Anecdotal evidence can be found in the predominance of intra-firm (within 
firms) transactions over inter-firm (between firms) transactions. Further evidence is 
suggested by the role played by some states in developing programs to assist firms in 
finding partners and minimizing administrative costs (see Harrison 1999).  
Kerr et al. (1998) found evidence that transaction costs prevented trading in lead 
phase-out programs because of under-developed brokerage and trading mechanisms. They 
estimated that the loss of cost effectiveness from these costs was 10–20 percent and quite 
dependent on the characteristics of traders and the market (which increased when potential 
traders were small, unsophisticated, and poorly integrated). Gangadharan (2000) also found 
evidence for the existence of transaction costs during the initial years of the RECLAIM 
program. According to her, the absence of brokers increased the costs of finding a trading 
partner—in addition to the high information costs of entering the market—and reduced the 
probability of trading by about 32 percent. The author also found specific “learning by 
doing” effects in the permits market. The results suggested that increasing the number of 
times a facility enters the market reduces information costs until a certain point (15 trades) 
is reached. After that point, further increases in the number of trades seems to have no 
effect in reducing information costs further.  
The Acid Rain Program was consciously designed to minimize transaction costs. 
Rights were allocated according to principles that were quite transparent and remained 
constant for a long period. The auction market established as part of the sulfur allowance 
program reduced transaction costs by providing an easy means for buyers and sellers to 
transact, but also by providing systematic public information on prices. This allowed 
private firms to offer a variety of trading services, such as private brokerages, electronic 
bid/ask bulletin boards, and permit-price forecasts. With this available data, researchers 
were also able to isolate the effects on transaction costs. Conrad et al. (1996) confirmed that 
transaction costs did not significantly affect the trading and price of the SO2 program. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Monitoring and enforcement are important design issues to be considered. Without 
them, trading programs do not provide enough incentives for a high degree of compliance. 
Compliance requires matching emissions and permits and needs specific technology to 
measure and account for allowances permanently. On the other hand, enforcement of the 
programs depends not only on the technical ability to detect violations but also on the legal 
ability to deal with them, once detected, via effective sanctions. 
Direct continuous monitoring of emissions has been an important factor in the 
success of the Acid Rain Program. Rigorous checks and balances ensure compliance, 
system credibility, and integrity. Every allowance is assigned a serial number; EPA records 
transfers make sure that a unit’s emissions do not exceed the number of allowances it holds 
and makes this information available to the public. 
Stranlund et al. (2002) analyzed the compliance incentives faced by firms under the 
Acid Rain Program and RECLAIM, stressing the importance of implementing fixed and 
automatic monetary penalties for emissions violations. While SO2 abatement apparently 
achieved a perfect compliance record, compliance rates in the RECLAIM program have 
ranged between 85 percent and 95 percent. Non-compliance seems related to the uncertain 
value of monetary penalties, since under RECLAIM the stated monetary penalties are 
maximum administrative penalties and actual sanctions are decided on a case-by-case basis.  
A key issue in any tradable permit program is the initial allocation of permits. 
Despite a common preference for auctioned permits among economists, grandfathering of 
incumbent emitters has been applied in virtually all applications to date to gain political 
consensus for implementing the program. Only in the Acid Rain Program, Singapore’s CFC 
program, and EU ETS program have auctioning schemes been introduced. In the Acid Rain 
Program, a small portion of the permits are auctioned out to make up for market 
imperfections and/or to accommodate newcomers to the market. Singapore’s CFC auction 
of half its permits enables the government to appropriate a sizeable share of the scarcity 
rents, which is used to subsidize recycling services and the diffusion of information on 
alternative technologies. Finally, in the EU ETS program, member states are allowed to 
auction up to 5 percent of their allowance in the first trading period and up to 10 percent in 
the second period, but few countries make much use of this option. 
However, as shown by Sterner and Müller (2008), the incentives provided by free 
allocation schemes depend very much on the permit allocation rules, and any rule where the 
firms can affect allocation (even indirectly in the future) will distort incentives and program 
efficiency. This was the case in the lead program, for example, where each refinery was Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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allowed to average concentrations across the gallons it produced. The refineries and other 
agents thus gained more rights by selling more gasoline. 
2.    Santiago’s Tradable Permit Program 
In 1992, the Chilean environmental authority established a tradable permit program 
PROCEFF (Program for the Control of Fixed Substances)2 for total suspended particles 
(TSP), trying to control the adverse effects produced by the excessive level of this pollutant 
in Santiago. Due to their easy identification and relative importance, the system focused on 
large boilers, which at the time accounted for more than 40 percent of total point-source 
emissions. Although the program became mandatory in 1994, it became active in 1997, 
giving the environmental authority two years to collect information on sources’ emissions.  
The environmental law regarding the tradable permit program rests mainly on two 
pieces of legislation: Supreme Decree 4 (passed in 1992) and Supreme Decree 16 (passed 
in 1998). SD 4 established an individual cap for the emissions of industrial and residential 
boilers discharging emissions through a duct or stack at flow rates higher than 1000 
m
3/hour (large boilers) and a tradable permit program that let this type of source exceed the 
cap through offsets from other large boilers. For that purpose, it distinguished between 
existing and new large boilers. Existing boilers—those installed or approved before 1992—
were endowed with emission permits called “initial daily emissions” (IDE). Each unit of 
IDE allows the holder to emit one kilogram of TSP daily. New large boilers—installed or 
approved after 1992—are required to fully offset their emissions through abatement in 
existing large boilers. Emissions parameters for new large boilers are known as “daily 
permitted emissions” (DPE) and have the same characteristics as IDE. 
Since regulated sources were relatively small for the purpose of implementing 
sophisticated monitoring processes, the program was not designed on the basis of actual 
emissions but rather on a proxy variable equal to the maximum emissions that a source 
could emit in a given period of time. Thus, the daily cap on emissions of existing large 
boilers was calculated according to a formula that allowed them to emit a maximum given 
by the product of the maximum flow rate (m
3/hr) of the gas exiting the stack times 24 hours 
of operation times a target on emissions concentration equal to 56*10
-6(kg/m
3).  
                                                 
2 PROCEFF is the government office responsible for implementing and enforcing the environmental 
regulations intended to control fixed sources emissions. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Table 1.   Syntheses of PROCEFF’s Main Regulatory Adjustments and Program 
Features 
Affected sources  Industrial and residential boilers discharging emissions through a duct or stack at a 
flow rate higher than 1000 m
3/hour in Santiago 
Covered pollutants  Suspended particulates (kg/day) 
Permits allocation 
Grandfathering: Existing large boilers installed or approved before 1992 were 
granted emission permits called “initial daily emissions” (IDE), according to the 
following formulas: 
  IDE 
1997–1999(kg/day): flow rate1997 (m
3/hr) * 24(hr/day)* 0.000056 (kg/m
3)  
  IDE 
2000–2004(kg/day): flow rate1997 (m
3/hr) * 24(hr/day)* 0.000050 (kg/m
3)  
  IDE 
2005– (kg/day): flow rate1997 (m
3/hr) * 24(hr/day)* 0.000032 (kg/m
3)  
 
Permits above the adjusted cap were taken away. 
 
Existing large boilers not using their IDE had two years to sell their permits before 
they became void.  
 
Existing large boilers exiting the market have three years to sell their permits before 




2000–        : 1.5 
Emissions trading  Credit-based: All trades require approval by the regulatory agency, even those trades 





emissions inventories and 
permits accounts 
System is maintained by a regulatory agency. 
Under-developed brokerage 
Monitoring and reporting 
Annual report  
Self-reporting 
Penalties  Penalty fee ranges from US $4.50 to $90,000. 
Automatic monetary 
penalties 
Monetary penalties are maximum administrative penalties and actual sanctions are 
decided on a case-by-case basis. 
As the program progressed, PROCEFF realized that its initial emissions cap was too 
generous. SD 16 modified the quantity of allowed emissions for existing large boilers.3 In 
                                                 
3 SD 16 also established a compensation program for industrial processes, intending to reduce the emission of 
particulate matter and NO2. The program began May 1, 2007. For large boilers, large processes were 
classified between existing and new ones. In the case of particulate matter, existing processes were granted 
 Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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2000 the targeted emission concentration was decreased to 50*10
-6(kg/m
3) and was reduced 
again to 32*10
-6(kg/m
3) in 2005. The offsetting rate was also modified. Initially, it was set 
at 100 percent, but in 1998, it was increased to 120 percent, and in 2000 to 150 percent.  
Santiago’s tradable permit program is a credit-based program. All trades require 
approval by the regulatory agency, even those trades among large boilers that share 
common ownership. Sources trying to offset their emissions must request the offset and 
find a partner, signing an offsetting agreement specifying the emissions to be compensated 
and the sources involved in the transaction (in the case of unrelated sources, both steps 
must be legalized by a public notary), and, finally, certifying the level of emissions of each 
source in the transaction through formal monitoring procedures. After all this paperwork, 
PROCEFF accepts or rejects the transaction or asks for additional information. If the 
transaction is accepted, a resolution grants the buyer a level of allowable daily emissions. 
Permits are given in perpetuity and large boilers are restricted to trading permits on 
a permanent basis. This feature of the program makes banking (and borrowing) of permits 
virtually impossible. It is an important restriction in the structure of the property rights that 
differentiates this scheme from the U.S. SO2 program or the carbon rights in the European 
ETS, where permits are distributed on an annual basis and used to cover emissions in a 
particular year. As pointed out by Montero et al. (2002), a consequence of this feature of 
the program is to create an illiquid market where sources are uncertain about the 
availability of permits in the future and where buyers pay prices close to their top prices, 
even if in the aggregate there is an over-supply of permits. 
SD 16 established that existing large boilers not using their IDE or wanting to exit 
the market had two and three years, respectively, to sell their permits before they became 
void. Therefore, IDEs have an expiration date, and sources are not allowed to save credits 
for future use or sale for a long period. 
Occasionally brokers have provided information about trading partners and about 
the trading process. However, most sources have relied on the environmental authority to 
                                                                                                                                                     
emissions permits equal to 50% of their actual emissions in 1997. In the case of NO2, they were granted 67% 
of their actual emissions in 1997. New processes would offset 120% of their NO2 emissions and 150% of their 
emissions of particulate matter.  
 Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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deliver such information, which is supposed to provide an annually updated record of the 
IDEs and DPEs in force.  
The program relies on self-reporting by regulated sources. Existing and new large 
boilers report emissions once a year to the program authorities. To comply with reporting 
requirements, sources must contact an independent and certified laboratory to monitor the 
flow and the concentration of emissions discharged through their stacks. Dual sources, 
which burn more than one fuel, are compelled to declare and offset their emissions as if 
they were using the dirtiest fuel. Thus, there is no incentive for firms that use two fuels to 
use as much as possible of the cleaner fuel, which is an unfortunate design detail.  
Sources that do not comply with the reporting requirement face sanctions that can 
be imposed through an administrative procedure. Palacios and Chavez (2005) highlighted 
two important features of the sanctions in Santiago’s program. First, sanctions are not 
clearly specified. Second, they are not automatically imposed. In fact, according to the 
authors, sanctions might include a note of violation as well as a wide range of lump-sum 
monetary sanctions ranging from US$ 4.50 to $90,000. The level of the sanction actually 
imposed depends, in an unclear way, on each particular case, considering the extent of the 
emissions capacity violation and backsliding of the source, among other things. In addition, 
a prohibition on a source’s operation is also possible, although infrequent. 
The comparison between the features of the relatively successful SO2 programs and 
Santiago’s program suggests two outcomes. First, transaction costs are expected to be 
significant because of the requirement for regulatory approval and the under-developed 
brokerage component. Second, a significant rate of non-compliance should be expected, 
since monetary penalties are not clearly defined and actual sanctions are decided on a case-
by-case basis. 
3.  Performance of Santiago’s Tradable Permit   Program 
Table 2 summarizes some statistics about affected sources and shows the evolution 
of the stock of aggregate emission permits from 1997 to 2007. The summary was prepared 
using PROCEFF databases and contains information about the number of sources in the 
program, initial allocation of permits, aggregate emissions, offsetting of permits, sources’ 
flow rates, emissions concentrations, and number of firms using cleaner fuels. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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At the beginning of 1997, 4045.40 kilograms4 of particulate matter emissions were 
allocated among 430 existing sources. Currently, only 53.7 percent of the initial allocation 
of permits remains in force and 60 percent are in hands of new large boilers. 
Notice that although the aggregate cap on emissions has been respected from the 
beginning, new sources did not offset their emissions during the first years of the program. 
Montero et al. (2002) argued that one of the reasons behind this outcome was the lack of 
institutional capability to regulate stationary sources. Before permits could be distributed, it 
was necessary to develop a comprehensive inventory of sources and their historical 
emissions. Because of limited resources, the regulator concentrated all its regulatory 
activity on the completion of the inventory and the allocation of permits. The process lasted 
five years, and during that period the regulator did not track trading activity, so there was 
no reconciliation of permits and emissions until the market began to take off at the end of 
1998. 
Table 2 also shows that the permits in force have exceeded actual emissions since 
the beginning of the program. Two reasons explain this. First, since the environmental 
authority had a poor historic record of sources’ emissions at the time the program was 
implemented, they overestimated the maximum amount of emissions that sources could 
potentially emit. Second, the fuel switching process made compliance more feasible. 
Regarding the first point, the environmental authority granted emission permits 
assuming a standard 24 hours of activity. However, large boilers work, on average, 18 
hours per day. Additionally, 128 sources that did not exist in 1997 received emission 
permits because they were operating at the time SD 4 was passed. These factors produced 
an immediate excess of permits in the hands of the initial holders. 
The difference between permits in force and aggregate emissions has remained 
because the switch to cleaner fuels5 has led to a decrease in the aggregate emissions. 
                                                 
4 According to Montero et al. (2002), this amount was estimated to be 64% of the aggregate emissions prior to 
the program. 
5 Sources began to switch to light oil, liquidified gas, kerosene, and natural gas. All of them produce a lower 
emissions concentration than the most demanding threshold imposed by the tradable permit program, which is 
32*10
-6(kg/m
3). For example, light oil and kerosene have an emission concentration equal to 30*10
-6(kg/m
3), 
and this value decreases to 15*10
-6(kg/m
3) in the case of liquefied and natural gas. Thus, the switch allowed 
sources to over-comply with the emissions’ cap. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Table 2.    Summary Statistics for Affected Sources  
Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Number of sources 593 583 516 534 495 513 521 526 519 526 511
Existing sources 430 402 332 324 286 277 273 264 251 235 217
New sources 163 181 184 210 209 236 248 262 268 291 294
Permits in force (kg/day) 4045.40 4044.40 4054.56 3710.37 3680.43 3087.34 2944.86 2856.05 2315.87 2204.17 2171.70
Initial daily emissions (IDE) 4045.40 3963.36 3672.76 3195.08 2981.53 2162.52 1897.75 1746.98 1123.49 929.75 851.59
Daily permitted emissions (DPE) 0 81.04 381.80 515.29 698.90 924.82 1047.11 1109.07 1192.38 1274.42 1320.11
Aggregate emissions (kg/day) 2544.79 1804.60 865.75 824.55 650.21 603.59 649.76 624.33 688.51 848.59 791.73
Existing sources 1684.27 1214.04 622.29 599.92 465.75 439.43 404.40 445.87 498.61 422.17 467.87
New sources 860.52 590.56 243.46 224.63 184.46 164.16 245.37 178.46 189.91 426.42 323.86
Excess of Permits
 (a) 1500.60 2239.80 3188.80 2885.81 3030.22 2483.75 2295.10 2231.72 1627.35 1355.59 1379.97
Existing sources 2361.13 2749.32 3050.47 2595.15 2515.78 1723.08 1493.36 1301.11 624.88 507.59 383.72
New sources -860.52 -509.52 138.34 290.66 514.44 760.66 801.74 930.61 1002.47 848.00 996.25
Flow rate (m
3/hour)
Average 4642.66 5131.59 4444.37 4444.98 5525.67 5415.96 5427.57 5349.46 5437.55 5947.64 6542.28
Standard deviation 3892.18 4790.80 3733.36 3746.09 5799.30 5661.77 5595.13 5458.10 5583.59 5968.65 6843.83
Maximum 182843.0 261304.7 182843.0 265122.3 610563.3 610563.3 610563.3 610563.3 610563.3 631607.2 773137.1
Minimum 381.7 440.0 385.4 381.7 276.0 276.0 276.0 303.6 303.6 305.0 305.0
Concentration (mg/m
3)
Average 87.58 83.62 49.72 35.81 21.17 16.53 13.36 11.57 10.63 10.30 11.32
Standard deviation 47.46 49.98 23.84 21.61 12.79 9.57 7.48 6.98 6.38 6.65 8.30
Maximum 629.50 915.00 111.20 110.70 110.10 97.80 92.50 91.80 94.60 98.40 352.40
Minimum 8.80 8.80 2.60 2.70 2.70 1.30 1.50 0.50 0.90 0.10 0.30
Hours of operation
Average 16.5 16.9 18.4 17.8 18.5 17.8 18.1 17.9 17.8 19.4 19.2
Standard deviation 6.99 6.92 6.34 6.74 6.46 6.63 6.65 6.71 6.86 5.93 6.04
M a x i m u m 2 4 2 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 4
M i n i m u m 1 1 1 . 5 1 . 521 1 . 5 1 . 5111
Number of sources using cleaner fuels
Using cleaner- non natural gas fuels 214 265 246 239 210 186 189 171 160 176 215
Existing sources 108 138 137 123 103 85 82 72 66 69 73
New sources 106 127 109 116 107 101 107 99 94 107 142
Using natural gas 0 54 131 162 204 231 228 234 222 277 221
Existing sources 0 36 77 90 110 120 116 119 105 105 83
New sources 0 18 54 72 94 111 112 115 117 172 138
(a) Excess of permits corresponds to the difference between the permits in force and the aggregate emissions
Source: Elaborated from PROCEFF databases
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Regarding this process, sources began to switch to cleaner fuels from 1995, in response to 
several environmental regulations. The most popular cleaner fuel was natural gas, which was 
imported from Argentina in 1997. After its arrival, it became the cheapest and cleanest fuel 
readily available. A switching process quickly started and currently about 50 percent of large 
boilers have declared their intent to use natural gas (although many of them are dual sources and 
also burn light oil).  
Unfortunately, from 2004 on, Chile has faced severe restrictions over the amount of 
natural gas that can be imported, giving rise to its so-called “natural gas crisis.” Since then, large 
boilers have faced more and more severe restrictions over the quantity of natural gas available 
and have again started to burn light oil, which has led to an increase in the aggregate emissions. 
In fact, aggregate emissions in 2007 were almost 27 percent larger than aggregate emissions in 
2004. 
To better understand the impact that the lack of reliable data about sources’ activity and 
the process of switching fuel has had on the excess of permits, we divided the excess into these 
two components. Thus, we calculated the excess of permits in force that would have been 
produced had the environmental authority allocated the initial cap based on the actual activity 
level of existing sources. This excess corresponds, then, to the difference between the aggregate 
permits granted that would have been based on actual activity less the actual aggregate 
emissions. 
Second, we calculated the excess of permits in force that would have been produced if 
existing sources had met the legal emissions’ concentration target6 and without over-compliance. 
Thus, this excess corresponds to the difference between the actual aggregate amount of permits 
granted and the aggregate emissions that would have been produced if existing sources had 
precisely accomplished the legal   emissions’ concentration target 
The first counterfactual allows us to identify the effect of the overestimation of the 
maximum amount of emissions that sources emitted, while the second counterfactual identifies 
the effect of the switching process on the emissions’ cap over-compliance.
                                                 
6 The legal emissions’ concentration target was 0.000056(kg/m
3) from 1997 to 1999, 0.000050 (kg/m
3) from 2000 
to 2004, and 0.000032 (kg/m
3) from 2005 onward. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Figure 1 shows the actual excess of permits beside both counterfactuals. Although the 
overestimation of the maximum amount of emissions emitted has some role explaining the 
excess of permits in force, the switching process seems to explain most of the excess over time. 
In fact, if the affected sources had not switched to cleaner fuels, aggregate emissions would have 
exceeded the aggregate permits for most of the period. 
Notice that the initial overestimation of the required permits allowed an accommodation 
of the aggregate level of non-compliance from new large boilers. If permits had not been granted 
in excess, the lack of offsetting would not have accomplished the target cap on emissions. 
Figure 1.    Excess of Permits 
 
 
But as suggested by Palacios and Chavez (2005), aggregate over-compliance has 
coexisted with usual violations by some of the sources. Table 3 summarizes information about 
the incidence of individual violations of the emissions cap from 1997 to 2007. Two types of 
violations are considered: those produced when existing sources exceed the assigned IDE, plus 
any net transfer, and those produced when new sources do not cover their daily emissions with 
permits.  
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF
Excess of Permits in Force 
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Year
Kg/day 
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As expected, the enforcement design used in Santiago has not induced a high level of 
compliance, particularly with new sources. On average, almost 30 percent of large boilers in the 
sample did not meet their obligations regarding the cap on emissions at some point, with almost 
80 percent of these sources being new sources. Both the number and magnitude of violations has 
decreased over time, although the natural gas crisis broke this trend slightly. Before the switch to 
cleaner fuel, large boilers burned dirtier fuels, such as coal, firewood, and heavy oil. Since 2005, 
in response to the lack of sufficient natural gas, the number of non-compliant existing sources 
has increased, as have additional violations; large boilers have begun to burn dirty fuels again, 
exceed their emissions’ caps, and commit other violations.  
Tradable permits are believed to promote “dynamic efficiency” because firms can expect 
to keep some or all of the gains from innovation through reduced abatement costs plus reduced 
payments for permits. Considering that the switch to natural gas was quite important for 
compliance with the emissions cap, it is worth asking whether or not the tradable program had 
some role in encouraging sources to switch to cleaner fuels.7 Empirical evidence, however, does 
not support such a hypothesis. According to Coria (2006), the lower price of natural gas seems to 
have been the main driver behind the switch, while the tradable permit program had little or no 
effect. This result seems related to the features of the Santiago program. In fact, the aggregate 
excess of supply must have produced a very low permit price, making the benefits from saved 
emission permits irrelevant. Second, since dual sources were compelled to declare and offset 
their emissions as if they were using the dirtiest fuel, they had no expected gains from reduced 
payments for permits. Finally, the expected gains from reduced payments could also have been 
irrelevant, since the lack of clearly defined monetary penalties and sanctions did not provide 
enough incentive for firms to care about good compliance or to invest in technologies to reduce 
emissions.
                                                 
7 Burtraw (2000) analyzed the innovation incentives under the Acid Rain Program. He found that innovation 
accounted for a large portion of the fall in compliance costs over the last decade. However, innovation was already 
in the works prior to, and independent of, the program. Nonetheless, the allowance trading program deserves 
significant credit for providing the incentives and flexibility to accelerate and fully realize these exogenous changes 
that were occurring in the industry. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Table 3.    Compliance in the Santiago Tradable Permit Program 
 
Variable 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
AccumulatedViolation (Kg*/day)   1255.19 811.03 289.11 246.55 156.07 112.32 198.18 153.84 175.05 197.93 221.26
Existing sources  505.88 255.58 88.80 48.29 12.49 6.86 15.16 58.82 92.55 114.78 124.89
New sources 749.31 555.45 200.31 198.26 143.57 105.47 183.02 95.01 82.50 83.15 96.37
Average Violation (Kg/day) 4.61 3.41 1.50 1.27 1.11 0.90 1.62 1.27 1.58 1.66 1.80
Existing sources  3.28 1.59 0.59 0.32 0.10 0.06 0.14 0.56 0.94 1.20 1.30
New sources 4.87 3.45 1.34 1.30 1.21 0.94 1.71 0.90 0.84 0.87 1.00
Maximum Violation (Kg/day) 89.19 89.19 28.3 25.63 21.60 9.12 92.8 40.74 45.09 56.96 45.09
Existing sources  89.19 89.19 28.3 25.63 2.78 3.14 9.16 40.74 45.09 56.96 45.09
New sources 65.60 45.14 18.48 21.60 21.60 9.12 92.8 7.0 23.76 14.16 15.49
Minimum Violation (Kg/day) 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.036 0.030 0.018 0.005 0.030
Existing sources  0.08 0.012 0.248 0.58 0.42 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.06
New sources 0.008 0.008 0.010 0.006 0.006 0.002 0.036 0.030 0.018 0.005 0.003
Number of non complying sources 272 238 193 194 140 125 122 121 111 119 123
Existing sources  1 1 8 7 74 34 12 11 31 51 613 23 27
New sources 154 161 150 153 119 112 107 105 98 96 96
% of non complying sources 46% 41% 37% 36% 28% 24% 23% 23% 21% 23% 24%
Existing sources  20% 13% 8% 8% 4% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 5%
New sources 26% 28% 29% 29% 24% 22% 21% 20% 19% 18% 19%
* Sources violate the program when their emissions exceed their permits. Added violation corresponds to the addition of sources’s violations. 
Source: Taken from PROCEFF databases.Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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3.1 Trading  Activity  and Transaction Costs 
Table 4 shows the trading activity to date. So far, 240 transactions have been approved, 
involving 445 sources and 39 percent of the initial allocation of emissions permits.8 As expected, 
evidence suggests the important role played by transaction costs in the pattern of transactions. 
Around 76 percent of the transactions correspond to intra-firm trading, while 24 percent 
correspond to inter-firm trade transactions. Further evidence is suggested by the larger amount of 
emissions traded in inter-firm transactions and by the nearly 25 percent of sources which offset 
emissions and also traded more than once (learning effect).9 
Table 4.    Trading Activity 
# sources # of transactions Total kg/day Average kg/day 
(a)
Aproved transactions 445 240 1579.02 6.58
Intrafirm 313 182 996.37 5.47
Interfirm 132 58 582.65 10.05
Sources trading more than once 114
N° of Sellers 221
Existing Sources 204
New Sources 17
N° of Buyers 224
Existing Sources 13
New Sources 211
Sources that lost emission permits 153 798.95
(a) It corresponds to the ratio between the total Kg/day traded and the number of transactions
Total Trading Activity
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF
 
Table 5 below shows some statistics about the length of time required to complete the 
transaction process. The average period required for a transaction to be approved is about 20.5 
months. However, since the beginning of the program, there has been quite significant 
                                                 
8 In 1997, 15.2 million allowances were traded in the Acid Rain Program, a program characterized by low 
transaction costs. This amount represents approximately 15% of the total allocation of allowances that year.  
9 Unfortunately, price information is not easy to obtain, since sources do not have to inform the environmental 
authority of the price agreed for their transactions and since intra-firm transactions do not have an explicit price. 
However, information from the few brokers suggests that prices ranged from US$ 10.741 (kg/day) in November 
1997 to $5.555 (kg/day) in March 1998, and from $3704 (kg/day) in October 2000 to $2144 (kg/day) in 2005. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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improvement. In fact, those transactions requested before 1998 needed more than 39 months to 
be approved.10 Fortunately, the number of months in the transaction process has been trending 
downwards over time.  
Surprisingly, intra-firm transactions took longer time to be approved, suggesting that 
regulatory efforts were focused on reconciliation of permits and emissions between firms. 
Table 5.    Transaction Process Period 
% of Total Aproved Transactions Average Period (in months)
Aproved Transactions 100% 20.49
Intrafirm 76% 22.38
Interfirm 24% 17.03
Transactions Required Before 1998 14% 39.21
Intrafirm 76% 39.23
Interfirm 24% 39.13
Transactions Required 1998-2003 64% 20.38
Intrafirm 72% 21.60
Interfirm 28% 17.98
Transactions Required From 2004 22% 8.55
Intrafirm 50% 9.27
Interfirm 50% 7.80
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF
Trading Process Period
 
Apart from the transaction costs and the uncertainty involved in the trading activity, the 
lengthy period it takes to the environmental authority to reconcile permits and emissions is also 
related to the high level of non-compliance by new large boilers. In fact, as is shown in table 5, it 
took several months for new large boilers requesting offsets to legally comply with the 
regulation. Thus, non-compliance is not just related to the lack of clear and automatic penalties 
but also to institutional failures making the compliance process uncertain and troublesome. 
Since many large boilers are dual sources (light oil and natural gas) and compelled to 
offset their emissions as the dirtiest fuel, there is no reason to expect a significant increase in 
                                                 
10 As a matter of fact, the first transaction was approved in August 1998. 
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trading activity due to the lack of natural gas. However, it could be possible to expect an increase 
in the trading activity by single fuel large boilers. Therefore, we divided the sample period into 
1998–2003 and 2004 onward. There is no evidence of an increase in the number of transactions 
approved from 2004. During the former period, the average number of transactions per year was 
26. Since 2004, it has been 13, although the rate of inter-firm transactions has increased.  
3.2 Policy  Adjustments 
Table 6 shows the effects of the policy adjustments described previously on the stock of 
emission permits. The increase in the rate of offsetting has reduced the total allocation of permits 
by about 6.3 percent. On the other hand, the decrease in the concentration target level accounts 
for another 20.2 percent decrease in these permits. Finally, 17.3 percent has been lost because 
existing boilers did not trade or use their permits before the legal deadline. 
Table 6.    Decrease in the Emission Permits in Force 
Total Kg per day %
Total emissions allocated at 1997 4045,40 100,0%
Emissions reduced due to the increase in the rate of offsetting in 1998 (1.2)  126,92 3,1%
Emissions reduced due to the increase in the rate of offsetting in 2000 (1.5)  130,97 3,2%
Emissions reduced due to the decrease in concentration target in 2000 (0.000050 Kg/m
3) 331,10 8,2%
Emissions reduced due to the decrease in concentration target in 2005 (0.000032 Kg/m
3) 646,50 16,0%
Emissions lost due to non-trading  638,20 17,3%
Total emission permits in force at 2007 2171,70 53,7%
Decrease In Emission Permits In Force
Source: Elaborated from data provided by PROCEFF  
 
Notice that the decrease in the number of emissions permits granted and the increase in 
the rate of offsetting have opposite effects on the attractiveness of trading. While the decrease in 
permits should have induced existing sources to trade before the decrease became binding, the 
increase in the rate of offsetting should have induced existing sources to retain permits if they 
were not sure of being able to buy permits back in case they were needed. This second effect 
should increase over time, since every time a new offsetting is produced, there is a net loss of 
permits in the market.  
Considering that 35 percent of the sources originally granted IDEs lost their emission 
permits, it is worth analyzing the reasons behind this outcome. Table 7 shows some statistics. Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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More than 50 percent of the sources which lost permits are no longer operating, and 25 percent 
of them stopped operations before the implementation of the program in 1997. This evidence is 
consistent with the rent-seeking behavior suggested by Montero et. al. (2002), who found that 
grandfathering the permits instead of auctioning them off created economic incentives for 
incumbent sources (some of which were nonexistent at the time SD 4 was passed) to more 
readily declare their emissions and claim the corresponding permits. 
Did sources lose their permits because of transaction costs? If true, the incidence of 
smaller, older, and poorly integrated sources losing emissions permits should be higher, since the 
costs of engaging in the trading process are greater. Data supports this hypothesis. There were 
clear differences in the level of aggregate emissions, size (flow rate), and level of integration 
between sources that lost their IDEs and those that did not. In fact, the incidence of poorly 
integrated sources losing emissions permits is quite significant. Just 9.2 percent of these sources 
had related sources to trade. On the other side, 78.3 percent of those which did not lose their 
permits had related partners. Thus, as expected, poorly integrated sources traded much less than 
integrated sources. 
Table 7.    Sources Granted with IDE 
Number Sources 153 100.0% 277 100.0%
Not operating 78 51.0% 47 17.0%
Not trading ever 97 63.4% 89 32.1%
Had related sources in operation 14 9.2% 217 78.3%
IDE (kg/day)
Aggregate emissions in 1997 (kg/day)
Flow rate in 1997 (m
3/hour)




Description of Sources Granted with IDE




4.  What Can We Learn from Santiago’s Tradable Permit Program? 
There is no doubt that despite of their theoretical advantages, tradable permit programs 
have been used far less frequently than command-and-control policies. Perhaps one of the most 
significant barriers to implementing this policy is finding a political process that favors the 
introduction of market regulations in environmental management. This has been the case in Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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Poland, where the main obstacle to the introduction of emissions trading during the 1990s was 
the low priority of the environmental issues combined with political controversies regarding the 
use of this market approach. But, according to Stavins (1998), the political process has gradually 
become more receptive to this policy instrument over the last decade. Currently, many donors 
and advisors are promoting the use of market-based instruments, such as tradable permit 
programs, as the key to more effective environmental protection in economies in transition as 
well as in developing countries. However, financial and institutional constraints have turned out 
to be significant barriers, which may make the use of this environmental policy more 
problematic than in developed countries.  
Before promoting the implementation of emission trading on economies in transition and 
in the developing world, we should review how developed countries have managed these issues 
to succeed. What have we learned about the requirements for tradable programs to work? Can 
less developed countries accomplish these requirements? In this paper, we studied the 
performance of the tradable permit program implemented in Santiago, emphasizing the design 
and implementation issues that have limited the development of the emissions’ market.  
The review of a successfully implemented trading program offers some lessons on the 
importance of realistic incentives to trade and spatial and temporal flexibility, including allowing 
the private sector to fulfill brokerage needs as well as monitoring and enforcement. Have these 
elements affected the performance of the Santiago’s tradable program? They have. Requirements 
for prior regulatory approval and the under-developed brokerage component have increased 
transaction costs, while there is a significant rate of non-compliance because monetary penalties 
are not clearly defined and actual sanctions are decided on a case-by-case basis. Additionally, the 
program is not temporally flexible. Permits must be traded on a permanent basis rather than an 
annual basis, they have an expiration date, and the banking option is not contemplated, so 
sources are not allowed to save credits for future use or sale for a long period.  
Beside the lengthy amount of time required to complete the transaction, the fact that a 
significant group of smaller, older, and poorly integrated sources lost emission permits because 
they did not trade before the legal deadline represents further evidence of the significance of 
transaction costs preventing trading. On the other hand, the increase in the rate of non-
compliance as the sources’ optimal response to the natural gas crisis reveals the important role 
played by the lack of enforcement.  
But in spite of the above-described weaknesses, the aggregate cap on emissions has been 
met and the trading activity has increased over time. However, is it likely that the high Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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transaction costs has decreased trading, with the result that full cost-effectiveness has not been 
achieved? 
A number of design modifications would have substantially improved the efficiency of 
the Santiago system:  
•  Better measurement of emissions at the time the program was implemented 
•  More certain tenure over the permits 
•  Avoidance of rules that hamper trade, for instance, the offset rules that provide a bias 
against trade 
•  Allow banking in some form 
Thus, Santiago’s experience shows us that the challenges of designing successful 
environmental programs in less developed countries should not be underestimated. If the Chilean 
environmental authorities do not work out the current weaknesses in design, the success of the 
trading program will remain quite limited. Obvious additional recommendations to improve the 
performance of the market seek ways to reduce transaction costs and to improve monitoring and 
enforcement. Improving data system and public access to data can help with the first task. In 
fact, although the environmental authority is supposed to annually provide an updated record of 
emission permits in force, information about actual emissions, violations, and trades is not 
publicly available. Enhancing public access to this information can build the credibility of the 
environmental program, allow brokers to enter into the market to provide information about 
trading partners and the trading process, and, finally, allow society to exercise pressure over 
firms to improve their environmental performance.  
From the Chilean experience, we can also learn that there are no clear reasons to believe 
that developing countries cannot benefit from the additional flexibility that tradable permits 
confer over more inflexible regulations. In fact, it took the United States some three or four 
decades of experimentation to learn how to design the institutions for a trading scheme. The 
Chilean scheme compares quite favorably with all the early U.S. programs and to the European 
ETS scheme, which, (despite being launched long after the Chilean scheme) has roughly the 
same number of flaws related to over-allocation and lack of clear rules for penalties. Thus, one 
might say that Chile’s experience demonstrates that a middle-income country is quite capable of 
implementing this type of scheme, even if much work remains before the design is really 
satisfactory.  Resources for the Future  Coria and Sterner 
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